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FURTHER COMMENT ON
UNITED STATES V. DONRUSS
In an attempt to avoid personal income tax liability, taxpayers
have often resorted to unique and complex individual income-reduction ploys. One such scheme involves the unreasonable accumulation
of corporate earnings. Under the Internal Revenue Code, such earnings "are not taxed to the shareholder when they accrue to the corporation, but instead are taxed when they are passed to shareholders
individually through dividends."'. Thus, as a result "of the disparity
between corporate tax rates and the higher graduations of individual
income tax rates, a corporation - particularly a closely-held one can significantly reduce shareholder tax liability by accumulating its
earnings beyond the amount needed to operate the business."'2 In order
to preclude utilization of this device, the Code imposes a penalty surtax, commonly termed the accumulated earnings tax, upon every corporation formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding personal
income tax liability on shareholders through the accumulation of
earnings. The increasing applicability of this tax has rendered it a
critical factor in the formulation of corporate tax planning,$ and in
this regard, a discussion of the recent Supreme Court case, United
States v. Donruss,4 is particularly relevant,
THE OPERATIVE SECrIONS OF THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX

The accumulated earnings tax, initiated in 1913,u has undergone
several significant changes since its inception. As the various sections
which comprise the total taxing apparatus are presently constructed,
the tax6 applies to all corporations which shelter their stockholders
from individual tax liability by accumulating, rather than distributing,
earnings.7 However, reflecting the congressional belief that one could
I Commissioner

v. Gordon, 591 U.S. 83, 90 n-5 (1968).
2 Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v, Donruss, 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
3 See Altman, Improper Accumulation of Earned Surplus, N.Y.U. 24TH INsT. ON FED.
TAx.805 (1966),

4 393 US. 297 (1969).
5 Tariff Act of 1913, ch, 16, § II G(a), 38 Stat. 172. The original penalty applied exelusively to "fraudulently" formed corporations, The difficulty in interpreting this word
led to its deletion in the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat, 1057, Personal
holding companies became subject to the tax under the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 102(a), 48 Stat. 702 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532). The evolution of the tax
reached its full cycle with the imposition upon the taxpayer of the burden of overcoming a presumption of tax avoidance. Revenue Act of 1938, ch, 289, § 109(b), 52 Stat. 482
(now r. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 533(a)).
OINT. R v. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37,
7 Id. § 531:
In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed for

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 44:273

not justly impose a penalty surtax upon earnings retained for reasonable business needs, the Code authorizes a credit for all accumulations
which are reasonable in regard to the taxpayer's business.8 Moreover,
the Code has adopted a liberal interpretation in determining what constitutes a reasonable accumulation, expressly providing that consideration may also be accorded to "reasonably anticipated" needs.9 The
Code further prescribes that in no case is such credit to be less than
the amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated profits of the
corporation as of the end of the preceding taxable year. 10
Prior to 1954, the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of an
accumulation had been upon the taxpayer. However, in that year the
Senate Finance Committee noted that this imposition led to several
undesirable consequences:
The poor record of the Government in the litigated cases in this
area indicates that deficiencies have been asserted in many cases
which were not adequately screened or analyzed. At the same time
taxpayers were put to substantial expense and effort in proving
that the accumulation was for the reasonable needs of the busi-

ness.31

In an attempt to remedy this situation, Congress enacted section 534
of the Code, which allows the taxpayer, upon receipt of notification of
a proposed notice of deficiency, to file a statement of the grounds on
which the corporation relies to establish the reasonableness of the aceach taxable year on the accumulated taxable income (as defined in section 535)
of every corporation described in section 532, an accumulated earnings tax equal
to the sum of (1) 271%
of the accumulated taxable income not in excess of $100,000, plus
(2) 388 % of the accumulated taxable income in excess of $100,000.
8Id. § 535(c)(1). See Canty, The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 1954 Reforms: An Appraisal, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 242, 258-62 (1968).
9 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 537. The 1939 Code was less liberal in this regard. INT.
REV. CODE of 1939, § 102(a)(c). See, e.g., World Publ. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186
(10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949), which held that a present need for the
accumulation must exist. The Code was subsequently amended in 1954. See S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The Finance Committee reported that there must be an
indication that the future needs of the business require such accumulation, and that the
corporation have specific, definite, and feasible plans for the use of such accumulation.
10 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c)(2). The credit is specifically denied to holding and
investment companies. See id. § 535(c)(3). Moreover, if a corporation declares a dividend
within a seventy-five day grace period commencing at the end of the fiscal year, surtax
liability will be avoided. See id. §§ 535(c)(4), 563(a).
11 S. REP. No. 1522, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954) (emphasis added). The Finance
Committee report continued:
The complaints of taxpayers that the tax is used as a threat by revenue agents to
induce settlement on other issues appear to have a connection with the burden of
proof which the taxpayer is required to assume. It also appears probable that many
small taxpayers may have yielded to a proposed deficiency because of the expense
and difficulty of litigating their case under the present rules.
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cumulation, together with facts sufficient to show the basis thereof.
The submission of such a statement will shift the burden of proof as
to reasonableness to the Government. However, if the Government
fails to provide the necessary notification of the proposed deficiency,
it must bear the burden of proof even though no statement is filed by
the taxpayer. 12 Once the accumulation is found to exceed the corporation's reasonable needs, it is, in all cases, deemed to be for the purposes of tax avoidance, unless the taxpayer can, by a preponderance
13
of the evidence, establish otherwise.
THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION
In order to facilitate the effective implementation of the accumulated earnings tax, the incidence of which is dependent upon the
taxpayer's state of mind, Congress recognized the utility of a presumption that the retained earnings were accumulated for the purpose of
tax avoidance. Since this presumption was not commensurate with
guilt, it did not de jure render one liable for tax evasion. 14 Rather, it
merely compelled the taxpayer to come forth and rebut the alleged
illegal intent:
A statute which stands on the footing of the participant's state
of mind may need the support of presumption . . . but the test
remains the state of mind itself, and the presumption does no
more than make the taxpayer show his hand. 15

Thus, an unreasonable accumulation created the rebuttable presumption of tax evasion, thereby placing the ultimate burden of proof upon
the taxpayer. Initially, such an unreasonable accumulation was considered "prima facie evidence" of the unlawful purpose. Subsequently,
1954, § 534.
defendant is a holding or investment corporation, this fact alone
supplies prima fade evidence of tax avoidance, id. § 533(b). Specifically exempted from
tax liability are corporations controlled by subchapter F of the Code. See id. §§ 501, 526.
For a general discussion of the accumulated earnings tax complex, see S. WErrHORN
& R. NOALL, PENALTY TAXEs AND PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANIES (1963).
14 See, e.g., United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935),
wherein the taxpayer successfully avoided the penalty surtax. Although the Tway court
found the imposition of the statutory presumption valid, it held that no reversible error
existed; the defendant corporation had not been availed of for the purpose of shielding
its shareholders from individual tax liability. But see National Grocery Co. v. Helvering,
92 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 304 U.S. 282 (1938), holding that the
presumption applies only when accumulations are unreasonable.
15 United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 635 (1933). This decision, the first to pass upon the statutory presumption, was
not concerned with the reasonableness of the accumulation. Liability was predicated
solely upon a determination of the taxpayer's state of mind, irrespective of the reasonableness of the accumulation.
12 INT. RxV. CODE of
13 Id. § 533(a). If the
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however, in an attempt to enhance the efficacy of the tax, 16 Congress
amended section 538 to provide:
[T]he fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with
respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.'1
It was this statutory presumption of tax avoidance which, to a great
extent, was determinative of whether or not the accumulated earning
surtax was to be levied. However, the imposition of the presumption
also compelled the judiciary to determine the manner in which it
could be successfully overcome by a taxpayer-corporation. The differing standards applied by the various federal courts of appeals in this
regard have resulted in rulings which were often discordant and irreconcilable. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, adhering
to a strict interpretation of the statute, held that the accumulated
earnings tax applied whenever tax avoidance was one of the purposes
for which coporate earnings were unreasonably accumulated:
The Board's conclusion may justifiably have been reached in the
view that, whatever the motive when the practice of accumulation
was adopted, the purpose of avoiding the surtax induced, or aided
in inducing, the continuance of the practice.' 8
Although this interpretation is admittedly stringent, the presumption
was successfully rebutted by the taxpayer in United States v. Duke
Laboratories,Inc."" The Commissioner had appealed from a jury verdict which found the accumulations to be unreasonable, but did not
find the proscribed intent of tax evasion. Noting that "[t]he jury was
told that [the purpose to avoid taxation] 'need not be the sole or dom16 Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102(c), 52 Stat. 483. An even more stringent application of the section had been proposed by the House Ways and Means Committee, i.e., the
imposition of a surtax upon all closely held corporations. See H.R. REP. No. 1850, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
Although the 1938 Act required a taxpayer to prevail by a "clear preponderance of
the evidence," this burden of proof was made somewhat more lenient for the taxpayer
by deletion of the word "dear" in 1954. However, at least one commentator has observed
this deletion to be one merely of form, rather than substance. See 7 J. MERTENs, LAW or
FEDERAL INcoME TAXAnON § 39.34 n.2 (rev. ed. 1966).
17 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a) (emphasis added).
18 Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 801 (1943), citing Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards, 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943) (emphasis
added). It has been suggested that the Trico court's reliance upon Helvering is misplaced,
since the latter decision concerned itself with a tax avoidance scheme which was initiated
before legislative imposition of the surtax and subsequently maintained solely to avoid the
tax. See Brief for Respondent at 14-15, United States v. Donruss, 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
19 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
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inant intent', ' o the Second Circuit, affirming, held that there existed
sufficient evidence upon which the triers of fact could have formed an
honest belief in the credibility of the taxpayer. Conceding that such
an instance of credibility would indeed be rare, the court regarded it
as clearly permissible under the statute.
A similar standard was applied by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Barrow Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,21 wherein
the court stated:
The utility of the badly needed presumption arising from the accumulation of earnings or profits beyond the reasonable needs of
the business is well nigh destroyed if that presumption in turn is
saddled with the requirement22of proof of 'primary or dominant
purpose' of the accumulation.
On the other hand, the Eighth 23 and Tenth 24 Circuits, rejecting this
interpretation and opting instead for a more liberal standard, required
the taxpayer to establish that tax avoidance was not the "determinative"
factor in the decision to accumulate. 25 But the last and most liberal

promulgation in this regard, often categorized as the "primary or dominant" purpose test, came from the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit: "The issue is not what are the necessary, and to that extent
contemplated consequences of the accumulation, but what was the
primary or dominant purpose which led to the decision."20
In order to resolve this conflict, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in United States v. Donruss.27
UNITED STATES V. DONRUSS

In Donruss, the respondent corporation had operated profitably
a confectionary business in each of the taxable years 1955 through
20 Id. at 283,
21294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 817 (1962). See also E-Z Sew
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Mich. 1966).

22294 F.2d at 82.
23 See, e.g., American Metal Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 860 (8th Cir.
1961); Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958).

24 See, e.g., World Publ. Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 911 (1949). It should be noted that, at present, few courts articulate their rationale
for selecting a particular test. See Comment, Donruss v.United States, 43 NoTRE DAME

LAw. 566, 569 (1968). In fact, many courts have attempted to completely avoid the

issue of imposition of a particular test by simply repeating the Code sections. See
Faber, Practitioner'sGuide to Defending a 531 Case - Theory and Practice, 27 J. TAx.
274, 277 (1967).
25 Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1958). Nevertheless,

the Kerr-Cochran court cited Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 799 (1943) (see
note 18 supra and accompanying text as valid authority).
25 Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1960).
27 393 US. 297 (1969).
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1961. Throughout this period all outstanding stock of the corporation
was owned by one individual, but no dividend was declared despite
the fact that retained earnings had increased from $1,021,288.58 to
$1,679,315.37. When the Commissioner assessed accumulated earnings
taxes against the respondent corporation for the tax years 1960 and
1961, it paid the required sum and subsequently brought a refund suit
in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. At the
trial, the Government specifically requested that the jury be instructed:
[I]t is not necessary that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the sole
purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of earnings; it is sufit is one of the purposes for the company's accumulation
ficient 2if
8
policy.
This request was denied by the district court, which, instead, utilizing
only the statutory language, instructed that tax avoidance had to be
"the purpose" of the accumulation. In response to interrogatories, the
jury found that the retained earnings were beyond the .reasonable
needs of the business. 29 However, it also found that the corporation
had not accumulated its profits for "the purpose" of avoiding income
tax liability. Accordingly, judgment was rendered for the respondent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding that the district court instruction might well have
led the jury "to believe that tax avoidance must be the sole purpose
behind an accumulation in order to impose the accumulated earnings
tax." 30 Additionally, however, the court rejected the Government's proposed instruction and ruled that the tax could be imposed only if tax
avoidance was found to be the "dominant, controlling or impelling
motive" for the accumulations. 31
Upon writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court took
a narrow view of the question before it, i.e., whether application of
the accumulated earnings tax requires that the corporation have as its
"dominant, controlling or impelling" motive the avoidance of income
tax liability, or whether it is sufficient that such avoidance is but one of
the purposes of the accumulation. 32 Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for
28 Donruss v. Commissioner, 384 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
29 Respondent had offered several explanations concerning the reasonableness of the
accumulations, including capital and inventory requirements; increasing costs; risk in
the particular business and the general economy; and a desire to invest in his major
supplier. Nevertheless, Donruss never challenged the jury's determination that the accumulations were unreasonable. 393 US. at 298.
30 384 F.2d at 298.
31 Id.

82 The Court specifically excluded any consideration of the second part of the statutory test, i.e., those factors which constitute reasonable business needs. 393 U.S. at S01.
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the majority, adopted the latter position, noting that the dominant
motive test would permit taxpayers to escape imposition of the tax
whenever it could be established that at least one other motive was
equal to tax avoidance purpose. The Court doubted that such a determination could be made with any degree of accuracy, since it would
depend almost entirely upon testimony of the corporate management
involved. This realization on the part of the Court reflected its complete acceptance of the Government position:
Rarely has a corporation but a single purpose for particular conduct. Any given corporation will be "availed of" for a variety of
"purposes." Tax avoidance seldom will appear as the sole or even
the most readily discernible motive, whether the focus of attention
be an accumulation of earnings or any other corporate act. Accumulated-earnings cases invariably involve a surplus, usually held
in cash or other quick or investment assets, which has a broad
variety of potential uses and has been accumulated by a series of
acts. Almost certainly, the purpose of tax avoidance, when present,
will arguably be intermixed with other objectives. Attempts to
apply the accumulated earnings tax are particularly likely to invoke assertions of multiple corporate purposes. The
potential
33
variations- of degree as well as kind- are endless.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in support of its
"dominant motive" test, had adopted the rationale of the First Circuit
in Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner,3 4 wherein it noted that the
statute did not require "a" purpose, but "the" purpose. The Supreme Court, however, refused to attach any significance to this use
of the definite article in section 533(a). 35 In addition to characterizing
it as "inherently vague," the Court found not only that Congress had
failed to import any significance to its inclusion in that section, but
also that adoption of the Commissioner's test would more fully effec36
tuate congressional intent.
With the imposition of a test in which virtually any degree of tax
avoidance intent on the part of the taxpayer triggers the penalty surtax, the Court was confronted by the objection that it was eliminating
any possibility of overcoming the presumption imposed by section
33 Brief for Petitioner at 12, United States v. Donruss, 393 U.S. 297 (1969).

34281 F.2d 488 (Ist Cir. 1960).
35 The Code provides that unreasonable accumulations "shall be determinative of the
purpose to avoid the income tax... :'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533 (emphasis added).
Neither litigant proposed that "the purpose" of the accumulation be solely an intent to
avoid the surtax. The Commissioner argued that if one of the purposes of the accumulation
was tax avoidance, liability should be imposed, while the respondent asserted that tax
avoidance be the "dominant" purpose. See 393 U.S. at 301. See also Canty, supra note 8,

at 252.

36 393 U.S. at 307.
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533(a). Indeed, it was readily acknowledged that cases in which no tax
avoidance design was present would be "isolated." Yet, the Court also
emphasized that "purpose means more than mere knowledge, undoubtedly present in nearly every case.'3 Thus, it remains "open for
the taxpayer to show that even though knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not contribute to the de38
cision to accumulate earnings."

COMMENTARY

The Donruss decision represents the culminant development in
the continuing attempt to strengthen the Commissioner's posture in a
section 533(a) presumption dispute.3 9 The subjective intent of the taxpayer has diminished in relevance, and the surtax is now imposed with
little regard for the purposes underlying the accumulation- as long
as the accumulation is deemed unreasonable. Although the courts
previously were permitted to determine intent even if the accumulation under scrutiny was regarded as reasonable, 40 reasonableness is now,
in effect, the sole determinant in the accumulated earnings tax complex. In the course of its opinion, the Donruss Court noted:
The reasonableness of an accumulation, while subject to honest
difference of opinion, is a much more objective inquiry, and is

effective scrutiny, than are the vagaries of
susceptible of more
41
corporate motive.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Supreme Court has yet to delineate
the proper standard to be utilized in arriving at a final determination
of "reasonableness." At present, "reasonableness" is defined in terms
37 Id. at 309. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in part, felt the majority's test removed
from the taxpayer a "last clear chance." He favored a test which would impose liability if:
[the jury] finds that the taxpayer would not have accumulated earnings but for
its knowledge that a tax saving would result.
Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
38 393 U.S. at 809.
39 This process began more than thirty years ago. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938):
The proposal is to strengthen the evidentiary section by requiring the taxpayer
by a clear preponderance of the evidence to prove the absence of any purpose to
.
avoid surtaxes upon shareholders..
Id. at 5 (emphasis added). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40 See Appollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966), holding that
in spite of the reasonableness of the taxpayer's accumulations, inquiry into his state of
mind was still permissible. See also Carolina Rubber Hose Co. v. Commissioner, 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1159, 1171 (1965):
After determining reasonable needs we must still determine whether petitioner
was availed of during these years to avoid tax on its stockholders by permitting
its earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed....
41393 US. at 307.
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of the "reasonably prudent businessman," 42 a standard which, despite
obvious difficulties, has found favor in other areas of tax law. 43 In determining the reasonable needs of a particular business, the judiciary
has variously emphasized several key factors, including objective need44
and utilization of the retained earnings in the business of the corporation 45 within a reasonable time, with definite plans set forth for future
use. 40 In addition, great latitude has generally been permitted in both
the purchase of an asset and the replacement of capital.4 7 It has been
rather difficult, however, to delineate adequate standards for the accumulation of working capital. 48 One attempted solution, providing
that earnings retained as working capital could equal one year's operating expenses, has proven inadequate simply because the individual
need for liquid assets varies greatly from one corporation to another. 49
An attempt to establish a ratio of current assets to liabilities has also
5 1 the
been deemed unsatisfactory. 50 In Dixie, Inc. v, Commissioner,
42 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Donruss. In discussing the concept of foreseeabil-

ity, the standard applied in the law of torts, i.e., the "last clear chance," is applied to
the law of tax. 893 US. at 310. See also 7 J. MEaRTENS, Lv or FEDma. INCoME TAXATION
§ 39.37(a), at 69 (rev. ed. 1966).
43 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1 (1968). Under the "reasonably prudent businesSman" test, the Commissioner will disallow surtax credit for an initially unreasonable
accumulation which later, due to unforeseeable circumstances, becomes reasonable.
44See id. § 1.537-2, which sets forth various objective tests. See also Bardahl Mfg.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1080 (1965). Cf. Trethewey, Effective Use
of Statistical Analysis to Fend Off 531 Attack, 30 J. TAX. 80 (1969).
45 See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3 (1968). To receive a credit for an investment in another
corporation, the taxpayer-corporation must establish that the corporation in which it
has invested is a "mere instrumentality," or that the taxpayer-corporation own a minimum
of 80 percent of the voting stock of the corporation in which it has invested. Personal
holding and investment companies are specifically excluded from this provision,

40See id. § 1.537-1. Accord, Fenco, Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 317, 323-24
(D. Md. 1964).
Several other factors, including the prior policy of the corporation in regard to retention of earnings and dividends, business expansion, the percentage of earnings distributed, and possible tax savings have been considered relevant. See J. MERTENS, supra
note 42, § 39.32 at 72. In addition, anticipated business competition, United States v.
Duke Laboratories, Inc., 37 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964), and expansion of business activities,
J. MERTENS, supra note 42, § 39.38 at 62, have been held to justify accumulations of earnings. On the other hand, a corporate loan to a shareholder is viewed as an indication that
the corporation has excess capital. Id. § 39.86 at 80. See also Treas, Reg. § 1.533(a)(2)(ii)
(1968). It is also clear that a fund for unanticipated emergencies will not be regarded as
a reasonable business need, Bardahl Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
65,200 (1965). See generally S. WErrHoRN & R. NOALL, supra note 13, at 21-41.
47 See, e.g., Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 339, 546-47 (2d Cir.
1964); Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959).
48 See, e.g., F. E. Watkins Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 288, 299 (1958); J. L.
Goodman Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 550 (1948).
49 See, e.g., Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Neb. 1964); Bremerton Sun Pub1. Co. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 566 (1965).
50 See, e.g., United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1935).
51277 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1960).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that while such a "rule
of thumb" may be proper for administrative convenience, the limits
of its utility should be recognized.52 As inordinate reliance upon such
touchstones is to be avoided, "the search must always be concerned
with the needs of a particular business as they existed during the particular year."58 The difficulty in establishing the "reasonableness" of an
accumulation is thus apparent. It is submitted that since neither test
has proven adequate, a new standard, possibly relating to custom and
usage within the industry, must be developed. One might also question
whether it will still be possible to introduce subjective evidence
tending to establish that different corporations within the same or a
related industry may have greatly different needs which are not readily
ascertainable. Additionally, assuming that an objective standard is
adopted, will it be possible for a corporation to accumulate earnings
with an intent to evade taxes and yet remain within the boundaries of
"reasonable need"?54
The Supreme Court has seriously weakened section 533(a)'s rebuttable presumption of tax avoidance, placing a virtually irrebuttable
one in its stead. Clearly such a result is contrary to the intent of a
Congress which had expressly rejected a proposed irrebuttable presumption. 55 Yet Donruss establishes that a corporation is "availed of"
for the purpose of tax avoidance whenever that purpose is one of
several objectives, irrespective of whether it is the impelling or dominant purpose. Accordingly, although a taxpayer may still rebut the
presumption of tax avoidance, the countervailing evidence must effectively negate all aspects of intent. Thus, the Donruss interpretation
actually discourages knowledge and understanding of the law. Judge
Learned Hand noted in Helvering v. Gregory5" that "anyone may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
52

Id.

53 Id.

at 528.
The need for a sound method of determining reasonability has been demanded

for:
[a] clear disclosure of the method by which the Court computed the working
capital required would not only go a long way to dispose of the issues . . . but
could be useful to the legal and accounting professions ...
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197, 207 (4th Cir. 1957).
A method of determining reasonableness which has yet to be thoroughly examined by
the courts is the "operating cycle formula." See Bardahl Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 25
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966); Bardahl Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1030 (1965).
54 See, e.g., United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 635 (1933), wherein the accumulation was reasonable, but the taxpayer's evasive
state of mind permitted the imposition of tax liability. See also note 40 supra and accompanying text.
55 See S. RP'. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 8d Sess. 5 (1935).
56 59 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
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bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there
is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."57 Donruss, on the
other hand, compels the imposition of the penalty surtax where the
corporation fails to establish shareholder ignorance of possible tax
savings. Indeed, it is clear that a "jury is very likely to believe that
it must find the forbidden purpose and impose the tax whenever the
Government shows that the taxpayer has accumulated earnings with
,8 Although the Supreme
knowledge of the resultant tax saving ....
more
than mere knowledge, it
means
Court indicated that "purpose"
never clearly delineated that distinction, and on a practical level, the
two concepts remain indistinguishable.
Significantly, the Code's presumption of tax avoidance is not triggered until the unreasonableness of an accumulation is established.
Accordingly, Donruss exaggerates the functional value of the taxpayer's
ability to shift the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the accumulation to the Commissioner.5" Yet many commentators have expressed doubt that this procedural device renders any real assistance
to the taxpayer.60 Indeed, the statement procedure is available only at
the Tax Court level. In sum, then, the Donruss interpretation merely
aggravates the abuses which Congress attempted to remedy in the 1954
Code. The impact of Donruss upon the intended function of the accumulated earnings tax further thwarts legislative intent. If the penalty
57 Id.

at 810.

58393 U.S. at 311 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
59 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 534. See also note 12 supra and accompanying text.

In deciding a section 534 pre-trial motion, the court does not adjudicate the truthfulness of the allegations, but merely shifts the burden of proof to the Government.
Raymond P. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1961); Chatham Corp. v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 145 (1967).
60 One commentator has labeled any protection afforded a taxpayer by section 535
"illusory." See Pye, Section 535 and the Shiftless Burden of Proof, 51 A.B.A.J. 784 (1965).
See also Nelson, Recent Trends Regarding Unreasonable Accumulations of Surplus, 43
TAxEs 857 (1965). The author contends the Congress underestimated the "ingenuity" of
the Service in "emasculating" the procedural advantages this provision provides for the
taxpayer. Id. at 862. The Service merely denies the allegations of the corporation, id., or
alternatively contends that the statement is not sufficiently clear and specific. See, e.g.,
65,308 (1965). These
Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
practices, coupled with a court's refusal to adjudicate the sufficiency issue prior to trial,
compel the taxpayer to proceed under the assumption that the burden of proof must
be borne by the corporation. Compare Carolina Rubber Hose Co. v. Commissioner, 34
65,229 (1965) and Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
(5th Cir. 1961) with Chatham Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 145 (1967). See also Grossman, Section 531 Problems Including One Bardahl Formula, 45 TAXES 913, 919 (1967);
Simons, The Gathering Storm of Section 531 of Our Tax Laws, 44 TAXES 528, 535 (1966).
In addition, this development deprives the corporation of the advantage it would
ordinarily possess in pre-trial proceedings with the Service. See generally Note, The Accumulated Earnings Tax - Sections 531-37 of the 1954 Code, 64 Nw.U.L. REv. 239,
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concept is to be preserved, 61 the burden should not be one of proving

reasonableness but rather should focus upon whether there has been
a conscious effort to avoid payment of the tax - even though the ques62
tioned accumulation may be reasonable.
Since the requisite motive is unlikely to appear in the context of
public ownership, the effect of the accumulated earnings tax has been
confined principally to closely-held corporations. 63 Accordingly, one
commentator has questioned whether the surtax inhibits the growth of
small corporations or precludes companies from growing as they otherwise might.64 Under the Donruss interpretation, the penalty surtax

will, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, be levied upon all
unreasonable accumulations. Thus, in order to avoid imposition of the
61 One commentator has suggested that the tax was never an effective penalty. See
Rudick, Effect of the Corporation IncOme Tax on Management Policies, 2 How. L.J. 232,
285-86 (1956).
62 In Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1959), Judge Learned Hand
stated his belief "that the statute meant to set up as a test of 'reasonable needs', only the
corporation's honest belief that the existing accumulation was no greater than was
reasonably necessary." Thus, the penalty surtax could not be levied if a corporation
honestly believed the unreasonable accumulation was in fact reasonable. However, it
appears that the judiciary often utilizes an objective, rather than a subjective, standard
of reasonable needs. For example, in many instances a plea of good faith is simply not
a credible defense for a grossly unreasonable accumulation. And even when the accumulation is not obviously unreasonable, protestations of innocence by corporate officers are
generally outweighed by the actual conduct of the corporation. See J. MaRTENs, supra note
42, § 39.26, at 47-48.
63 See Canty, supra note 8, at 246. See also Rudick, supra note 61, at 244, in which
the author states:
So far as large publicly-owned corporations are concerned, the importance of the
section as an economic factor can be dismissed. The managers of large corporations are sophisticated enough taxwise to know that they are immune from
worry about the section.
Citing Kales v. Woodworth, 32 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1929). The author continues:
With rare exceptions, they want to pay as high dividends as they feel they
safely can, bearing in mind contemplated expansion and other business requirements, and they know that if they improperly accumulate the income,
they will be brought to task by the stockholders perhaps faster than by the
Government.
Id. See also Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1943) discussed
at note 18 supra.
A further inherently discriminatory effect of the tax lies in the fact that it is often
advantageous for high income bracket shareholders to pay the penalty surtax at its static
rates, rather than at the progressive rates levied upon individual income. Under the
Code, personal income taxes range marginally from 14 to 70 percent, while the maximum
tax rate for a corporation is 48 percent. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1, 11. See also
Cummins Diesel Sales, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 746 (D, Ore. 1962), aff'd, 321
F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1963),
Several measures have been suggested as alternatives to declaration of a dividend.
However, most involve basic corporate restructuring. See Sullivan, Planning to Avoid the
Section 531 Tax, 17 W. Rs. L. REv. 763 (1966). The possible alternatives include:
(1) incorporation with substantial debt; (2) operation in unincorporated form; (3) subchapter S election; (4) additional minimum accumulated earnings credit; (5) personal
holding or investment companies; (6) foreign subsidies; and (7) liquidation.
64See Rudick, supra note 61, at 247.
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tax, a corporation is encouraged to declare dividends it otherwise
would not, rather than develop farsighted plans for future expansion.
One might also contend that the resultant conservative accumulation
policy precludes a corporation from retaining sufficient capital for
use during a period of depression. 5 This development would, of
course, have a deleterious effect upon the economy since it would tend
to accentuate inflationary and deflationary trends. 66 In addition, it is
possible that the surtax stimulates acquisitions, thereby tending to concentrate business enterprise.6 7 On the other hand, adoption of the
dominant motive test would enable the corporation to retain earnings
as long as it could establish that one of its purposes was bona fide, and
that this purpose was equal to or more than the tax avoidance motive.
The Donruss quest for certitude has, in fact, resulted in the perversion of the penalty surtax. Refusing to grapple with the nebuli of
intent, the Court has established that a corporation is "availed of" for
the purpose of tax avoidance whenever that purpose is one of several
objectives, regardless of whether it is the impelling or the dominant
motive. Indeed, the avoidance of the penalty surtax now mandates
either corporate justification of retained earnings or a drastic altera68
tion of the corporate structure.

65 Id. at 238-39. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Electric Regulator
Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 1964), that: "If the Tax Court's views
. were to be accepted, they would give to the Treasury virtually absolute power to
stifle or encourage economic growth."
66 Rudick, supra note 61, at 246.
67 See Hall, Revision of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 102, 8 NAT. TAX ,.
275 (1955); THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE SURPLus AccumULATIONs, A STruy PPARED Flor
THE JOINT Cor0ITmr ON THE ECONOMIC Rep. No. 1, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
68 See note 64 supra.

